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ABSTRACT 
Everyone has the right to demand respect for their privacy (private life). Hence, this right has 
been safeguarded in international law. However, in the digital age the boundaries of privacy 
have widened. Both state bodies and non-state organisations make frequent interventions. In 
fact, these interventions have to be carried out in line with legislation, with the permission of 
the authorities and in a proportional manner. In this article the historical origins, definition 
and scope of this right will be examined. Examples from domestic law will be presented and 
the approach of international bodies such as the United Nations, European Court of Human 
Rights and European Union mechanisms such as the Court of Justice of the European Union 
will be examined in detail.    
KEY WORDS: Right to privacy, private life, personal data, international human rights law, 
European Court of Human Rights, United Nations, European Union. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
From the earliest times human beings, as a social entity have shared public spaces with other 
human beings, while also having a personal and private life. What is mean by the term private 
life is the right to privacy. Private life is the term used to define the space which people allot 
to themselves and into which they allow the persons they want. Private life in fact protects us 
against arbitrary and unjustified interventions by states and other non-state actors. The 
control of this space is in the hands of the individual who does not want others to intervene.1 
Human dignity lies at the root of this right, and constitutes the basis of all other human rights. 
What is important here is to improve a person’s rights and their conditions of life, so that they 
may achieve their personal aims and ambitions. Within the broad scope of this right are 
things such as physical space, home, family life and correspondence. Hence, this sphere has 
been safeguarded by international law and by the laws of many countries.   
Private life is a fundamental right that should be respected by everyone (state and non-state 
actors) everywhere. This right received recognition in international law after the Second 
World War. However, it is necessary to be aware that due to the complexity of this right it is 
linked to different areas of law, for instance: property rights, health, insurance and financial 
law.   
However, with technological progress in the 21st century serious restrictions on people’s 
private life are being talked about. For instance, our movements can be monitored through the 
smartphones or computers we use. Data can also be gathered on individuals from search 
engines, social media, internet searchers and credit cards. This monitoring is in general 
carried out by states on security grounds.  
In this article, in addition to looking briefly at the historical origins of private life, a close 
examination will be made of its definition and scope. Additionally, how this right is defined 
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in national and international law will be explored and answers sought to the following 
questions: In private life how can the delicate balance between the gathering of personal data 
and security be ensured? What is meant by personal data? In what circumstances may this 
freedom be restricted?  
2. HISTORY, DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY  
In fact we even come across the origins of this right in primitive communities. Where there 
were no dividing walls or screens abstract private areas were created by ‘imaginary walls’. 
For instance, in the northeast of Peru the Yagua people who live in houses without dividing 
walls or screens will turn to the wall of the house when they want to establish a private space. 
When they do this they are in fact saying that they do not exist in that area. From the 5th 
century onwards, with the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the coming to power of 
tribes, people began to live in more protected houses, and privacy gained importance once 
again. In this context the inviolability of domicile and right to privacy were partially 
protected. For example, in 1361 the ‘Justices of the Peace Act’ foresaw the arrest of those 
who secretly listened in to or followed others.2 With industrialisation in the 16th century and 
increasing urbanisation mechanisms were developed to protect privacy with the press having 
an influence. In 1710 the opening of letters in England without the permission of official 
authorities was prohibited. In the United States of America there were debates over respect 
for private life in the 19th century. International debate on this topic came about after the 
Second World War. Technological developments in the 21st century have made it apparent 
that this right needs to be protected in a more serious way.3  
As regards the definition of private life in the literature there are serious difficulties as to its 
meaning and uncertainty in determining its boundaries. For instance, Arthur Miller said it 
was hard to define because of a tiresome vagueness and its tendency to disappear.4 As for 
Julie C. Innes, she said: “we turn to the legal and philosophical literature on privacy in the 
hope of gaining a foothold.”5 Unfortunately, the definition of private life has not been 
completely outlined in international documents. For instance, in article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’ and/or ‘the Convention’) we see there is no definition 
of private life. In Niemietz v. Germany the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated 
that a definition of private life was neither possible nor necessary: “The Court does not 
consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of ‘private 
life’. However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the 
outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise 
to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings…”6 The Court maintained the same stance in Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 
making reference to Niemietz v. Germany, reiterating that the concept of private life was not 
entirely suitable to be defined.7 
However, the impossibility of a definition does not imply that this right does not exist or is 
unimportant. The existence of this right is important for human dignity, freedom and 
democracy. Hence, this right, which is necessary in a democratic society for a person’s 
creativeness and to ensure we can establish and maintain social relations with others and also 
to safeguard an autonomous life and physical tranquillity, has been described as the heart of 
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all essential freedoms.8 According to a report written by the Special Rapporteur to the Human 
Rights Council in 2016: 
Recognizing that the right to privacy can enable the enjoyment of other rights and the free 
development of an individual’s personality and identity, and an individual’s ability to 
participate in political, economic, social and cultural life, and noting with concern that 
violations or abuses of the right to privacy might affect the enjoyment of other human 
rights, including the right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions without 
interference, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association…9  
It is apparent how this right has been violated by state and non-state actors, particularly now 
with the advances made in technology. According to the United Nations (UN) Special 
Rapporteur in 2016 one in ten of citizens in all member states suffered human rights 
violations relating to their personal data.10  
3. RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN NATIONAL LAWS 
It has been pointed out that in more than 33% of UN countries, that is, more than 70 states, 
there is no law pertaining to private life. In more than 75% of member states there are no 
safeguards or remedies relating to this right of citizens not being violated by other states.11 
But in more than 120 countries this right is safeguarded by national laws.12 Efforts are also 
being made in many countries to provide Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) or Regulators 
to protect personal data.  
For instance, it has been safeguarded by the 4th Amendment of the American Constitution: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”13  
In the German Constitution although the right to privacy is not openly expressed, it is 
evaluated within the framework of article 1(1) relating to human dignity and article 2(1) 
concerning freedom of personality. In the Chinese Constitution, although the right to privacy 
is not mentioned, this right is associated with the physical rights mentioned in article 37, 
human dignity referred to in article 38 and public spaces in article 39.14  
In the South African Constitution this right is clearly set down in article 14:  “everyone has a 
right to privacy which includes a right not to have one’s home, person or property searched, 
possessions seized and privacy of communications infringed.” Article 5 of the Brazilian 
Constitution states: “personal intimacy, private life, honour and reputation are inviolable”; 
Article 10 of the Finnish Constitution states: “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity 
of the home are guaranteed.” Article 20 of the Georgian Constitution states: “Everyone’s private 
life … shall be inviolable”; article 20 of the Turkish Constitution states: “Everyone has the 
right to demand respect for his/her private and family life. Privacy of private or family life 
shall not be violated.15 Article 26 of the Romanian Constitution states: “The public authorities 
shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life…”16  
Although in the Constitutions of Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and Indian this 
right is not mentioned, this freedom has been tacitly accepted as a constitutional right by 
means of court judgments. For instance, the Indian Supreme Court in 2017 made the 
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following judgment: “Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual. It is 
a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects 
for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination.”17 The protection of private life 
has also been guaranteed by law in these countries. For example, in Canada a law on ‘the 
Protection of Personal Information and Electronic Documentation’ was enacted in 2000. A 
similar law was passed in Japan in 2003.18 This right was safeguarded in the UK by article 8 
of the Human Rights Act of 1998, the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1949, the Copyright Act of 
1956, the British Telecommunications Act of 1981 and the Data Protection Act of 1984.19 
4. RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
This right is also safeguarded in international law. For instance, article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, articles 7 and 8 of the 
European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights, article 5 of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man and article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
are the main international provisions of the right to privacy. All these articles answer the 
question as to why privacy needs to be safeguarded. However, there are no answers as 
regards when, how and by whom this freedom should be protected.20 We see the answers to 
these questions in examples of case law or in resolutions passed on this issue.  
4.1. UN Human Rights System 
The UN General Assembly passed two important resolutions in 2013 and 2014 calling on 
member states to respect the right to privacy in their laws and policies in digital 
communications, and to take the necessary steps to ensure this (Resolution 68/167, December 
2013; Resolution A/C.3/69/L.26/Rev.1, November 2014). In 2015 the UN Human Rights 
Council appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy. This Special Rapporteur was 
asked in particular to make expert analysis on a human rights law perspective and give 
guidance as regards the right to privacy in the face of new technological challenges. Hence, 
in a report published on 1 March 2019 was the following: “As I have emphasised in the past, 
there is much work to be done to protect the right to privacy, and a defensive posture is not 
sufficient. We, Member States and institutions of the United Nations, need to actively 
entrench privacy as a standard in a democratic society.”21  
4.2. European Human Rights System 
There are two important mechanisms in Europe. The first of these is the Council of Europe, 
while the second is the EU. The ECHR and the ECtHR will be examined under the heading 
of the Council of Europe. Under the EU heading the Global Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) and decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) will be examined.  
4.2.1. European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 8 of the ECHR states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
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the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
As can be seen in this paragraph, this freedom also protects family life, the home and the 
confidentiality of correspondence in addition to individual private life. However, this is not a 
correct approach to only identify article 8 with the concept of private life. Personal 
identification, honour and reputation, personal data, physical and moral integrity and sexual 
life are also included in the concept of private life in judgments made by the ECtHR. As for a 
person’s identity, this includes the name, gender identification, ethnic identity and lifestyle 
and image. We will look closely in particular at the principle of the confidentiality of 
personal data within the scope of the above. States have the negative obligation to prevent all 
manner of arbitrary interference in this freedom.  States also have positive obligations to 
ensure that private parties behave in a respectful manner towards each other.22  
In addition to the positive and negative obligations of states, since this article is a “qualified 
right” the state or public authorities are legally entitled to interfere with this freedom in 
certain limited situations. There are three stage test that must be applied for this freedom to 
be restricted: 1-) Any interference by the state must be in accordance with law; 2-) It must 
satisfy one of the legitimate aims stated in Article 8(2); 3-) It must be necessary in a 
democratic society. This last point is very important as the ECtHR’s judges the concept of 
necessary according to whether there is ‘pressing social need’. On this point national 
authorities have a margin of appreciation as regards determining whether there is ‘pressing 
social need’.23  
4.2.2. European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law  
The protection of personal data is related to the right to privacy. The Court evaluates the 
gathering of data on a person’s private life and the holding and use of this data within the 
scope of Article 8.  The Court stated in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom that the 
gathering and holding of personal data, even if it is not used, constitutes a violation of Article 
8.24 The Court also takes into consideration the nature of the information gathered and held, 
the way it is used and possible consequences. Hence, the Court ruled in Klass and others v. 
Germany that states could not use the grounds of espionage and counter terrorism to monitor 
individuals as they wish.25 It was emphasised that interference with the rights of individuals 
should be subject to ‘an effective control’ and that attention should be paid to the principle of 
proportionality.26  
The Court constantly refers to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in its judgments. Article 2 of this Convention defines 
the concept of personal data thus: “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual…” 
The Court also frequently makes reference to Article 6 of this Convention: “Personal data 
revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data 
concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law 
provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal 
convictions.” In accordance with this article personal data is separated into two: specific data 
and other data.  
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Specific data concerns data such as ‘racial origin’, ‘political opinions or religious or other 
beliefs’, ‘health or sexual life’ or ‘criminal convictions’ as referred to in Article 6. However, 
the problem here relates to other data that is not mentioned in the article, but which may 
indicate a person’s identity or be sufficient to do so. In this regard the source that need to be 
referred to be the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In the Court judgments a person’s profile, 
photographs, fingerprints, DNA profile, cell samples, information regarding health, voice, 
security number, home address and personal spending are all within the scope of personal 
data.27 The Court also differentiates between data as to whether it is of a personal or public 
nature. For instance, while a person’s picture is of a personal nature, their political activities 
are of a public nature.  
The Court points out that a person’s photographs distinguish them from others on account of 
their unique character. For this reason they are important as regards a person’s personal 
development. This matter is particularly relevant in the case of a well-known person’s 
photographs being publicly shared, leading to a complicated situation. For it is necessary to 
strike a balance between a person’s reputation, as safeguarded by Article 8, with Article 10 
that protects freedom of expression. On this point the Court asks the following questions: 
“how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report?; prior 
conduct of the person concerned; content, form and consequences of the publication; 
circumstances in which the photos were taken; and severity of the sanction imposed.”28  
Particularly at the present time we frequently see our personal information used on search 
engines such as Google. This is an interesting example of conflict between Article 8 and 
Article 10, for while our personal information is on the internet, on the other hand there is the 
public’s right to information. The case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germanywas the first case to deal 
with the issue of press archives on the internet featuring previously reported news (para. 90 
and para. 102). In this case the Court rejected the applicants’ request for media organisations 
to be obliged to anonymise on-line archive material relating to their criminal trial and 
conviction (para. 116). In its judgment the Court stressed that Article 10 of the ECHR 
protects media archives, and public access to them. Nevertheless, the judgment did confirm 
the validity of the right to be forgotten enshrined in Article 8 being used against primary 
publishers in addition to search engines. Hence, it is important to distinguish this case from 
others in which individuals exercise their data protection rights as regards their personal 
information which is published on the internet and which may be obtained through search 
engines (para. 91) and used for profiling purposes by third parties (para. 97).29 
On 27 June 2017 the Grand Chamber of the Court found that in the case of Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland there had been no violation of the right to 
freedom of expression and information.30 The case in question involved the mass collection, 
processing and publication of personal taxation data publicly available in Finland. The Court 
found there had been no violation of Article 10 based on a narrow interpretation of (public 
interest) journalism and a wide margin of appreciation for the domestic authorities finding.31   
The Court found that the data that had been collected and published by newspapers, giving 
details of the tax affairs of many people, evidently related to their private lives, despite the 
fact that the general public was able to access the data, under domestic law, with certain 
limitations (para. 138). In such matters domestic law has to provide proper safeguards to 
prevent the use of personal data that could conflict with the guarantees enshrined in Article 8. 
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It is worthy of note that the Court emphasised that Article 8 provided for the right to a form 
of self-determination as regards information, in that it permitted individuals to rely on their 
right to privacy concerning data collected, processed and disseminated en masse and in a way 
that the Article 8 rights of the individuals in question are ensured (para. 137, see also para. 
198). 
Additionally, personal information is not only monitored by means of the internet, as our 
movements can also be monitored in public spaces by CCTV or different technological 
equipment. At this juncture the question as to what will happen to footage taken by video 
surveillance of public places comes to mind. The Court primarily evaluates this situation 
within the scope of Article 8.32 For instance, in this case a violation of Article 8 was found on 
account of video footage of the suicide of the applicant being shared without permission in 
the media.33 In the same way, it was stated that the sharing of photographs taken of persons in 
custody by the police or public authorities without permission constitutes a violation of 
Article 8.34 However, the sharing of photographs of a suspected terrorist was not found to be 
in violation of Article 8 as in this instance a state’s margin of appreciation was interpreted 
more broadly.35  
Moreover, the monitoring by states of communications is one of the most controversial issues 
of modern times. Although national governments and national authorities are granted a 
certain margin of appreciation when it comes to assessing the best policy in this sphere, 
States must carry out unlimited covert surveillance of persons within their jurisdiction. The 
Court has made clear that States may not use whatever measures they consider legitimate on 
the pretext of combatting espionage and terrorism; instead, there must be adequate and 
effective measures adopted to prevent abuse under whatever system of surveillance is 
utilised.36 Covert surveillance of citizens is only tolerable when it is absolutely necessary to 
safeguard democratic institutions.37 All such measures must be based on concrete and 
sufficient grounds and be proportionate to the legitimate purpose set forth.38  
The Court has also included the collection of DNA samples within the scope of the right to 
privacy. The gathering and holding of cellular material, and the determination and retention 
of DNA profiles extracted from this material, was found to be an interference with the right 
to respect for privacy enshrined in Article 8 para. 1 of the ECHR.39 This ban does not 
necessarily include the taking and holding of DNA profiles of convicted criminals for future 
use in criminal proceedings that may arise.40 As referred to above, such interference is a 
violation of Article 8 unless it is considered to be ‘in accordance with the law’, and can be 
justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 as trying to achieve one of the legitimate aims listed, 
and as being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in order to achieve the aim or aims in 
question.41  
In summary, the ECtHR, by broadening the scope of Article 8, is making clear that this 
freedom is not unlimited. However, bearing in mind the negative and positive obligations of 
states as regards restricting this right, it is necessary to carefully implement the three stage 
test we mentioned above. Otherwise, there will be a risk of violating the principle of 
proportionality and consequently violating Article 8.  
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4.3. European Union Legal System  
Apart from the ECtHR, another important mechanism in Europe is the EU. Article 7 of the 
EU Charter was constructed on Article 8(1) of the ECHR: “Everyone has the right to respect 
for his or her private and family life, home and communications.” However, Article 8 of the 
Charter for the first time included ‘personal data’ for the first time in international 
documents, guaranteeing it protection: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. 
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject 
to control by an independent authority. 
 
The EU Charter is not a statement of fundamental rights and privileges with a universal 
scope. Article 51 of the Charter states that it only applies to EU institutions and Member 
States when they are engaged in the implementation of EU Law. Thus, the Charter has an aim to 
guide the implementation and interpretation of EU Law, including the GDPR.42  
In Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others the CJEU stated: ‘The retention of data 
for the purpose of possible access to them by the competent national authorities, as provided 
for by Directive 2006/24, directly and specifically affects private life and, consequently, the 
rights guaranteed by Art. 7 of the Charter.’43 The CJEU found that holding private data 
violated Art. 7 of the Charter, and that national authorities having access to such data 
constituted a ‘further interference with that fundamental right’, referring to ECtHR case 
law.44  
The CJEU held in Google v Spain  that Google is responsible for the processing of the 
personal data in which it engages, as a data controller established in the EU, and is 
responsible for this data which appears on web pages published by third parties. Hence, 
Google has a responsibility to respect EU data protection laws (Arts 7 and 8 of the Charter) 
and also to comply with requests to remove links to certain personal data, under certain 
circumstances (the right to be forgotten).45 In A, B, C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en 
Justitie the national court asked the CJEU whether EU law imposed any restrictions as 
regards the verification of the sexual orientation of asylum applicants. According to the 
CJEU, Member States have the right to examine the truth of applicants’ statements regarding 
his/her sexual orientation.46 However, the methods used to evaluate the credibility of these 
statements by national authorities must respect the right to respect for private and family life 
and other fundamental rights.47 
In summary, the CJEU hands down similar judgments to the ECtHR. However, the EU has 
gone one step further by accepting the Global Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
2016/679 and the Data Protection Directive for law enforcement and police area in April 
2016. At this time the GDPR is the broadest provision in the world concerning data 
protection in the digital era.48  
Article 1 of the GDPR is as follows: “[Regulation] protects fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.” The Impact 
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Assessment of the European Commission noted that, “individuals are often neither aware nor 
in control of what happens to their personal data and therefore fail to exercise their rights 
effectively.”49 Hence, the GDPR emphasises autonomy and consent while also attaching 
equal importance to the duties of data controllers, without seeing whether data subjects have 
acted to enforce those duties.50  
The EU also established a body called the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) to 
deal with data protection in 2004. The role of the EDPS is one of independent adviser to EU 
institutions concerning all matters relating to the processing of personal data, including 
security initiatives and new data-exchange tools for law enforcement agencies. The EDPS has 
published many Opinions on initiatives designed to broaden information-sharing for the 
purpose of law enforcement inside the EU, including the Entry/Exit System and EU PNR - 
and also beyond  Europe, examples being the Umbrella Agreement with the US and PNR 
agreements with non-EU countries.51  
In summary, EU rules on the right to privacy in particular present the greatest source for us, 
as it has provided a very strong mechanism to protect personal data. The GDPR is not only 
implemented in organisations or institutions founded in the EU, but also in bodies founded 
outside the EU that are legal entities within the EU. In addition to providing new rights to 
individuals in the digital environment, new detailed obligations have been introduced for 
companies and organisations. In this regard it is important not to overlook the fact that the 
EDPS and CJEU have effective mechanisms. 
5. CONCLUSION  
It is impossible to define the concept of private life and to set forth exactly what it is. Within 
this freedom there is not only private life, but also freedom of ideas, expression, religion and 
conscience in social life. Although it is exceedingly difficult to define the concept of private 
life and draw its boundaries, this does not mean this right does not exist. This right is one of 
the most fundamental human rights and is important in the safeguarding of human dignity 
and autonomy. This right is the right of a person to live their private life without unwanted 
intrusion. Hence, this freedom protects us against arbitrary and unjustified interference by 
both state and non-state actors. In this context it is part of a state’s negative and positive 
obligations to develop and implement effective mechanisms to protect this freedom of 
individuals. These obligations have been clearly set down both in international law and in the 
domestic law of many countries.   
Of course, this right is not unlimited. However, interference in this right must be based on 
legal grounds and have permission and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. It 
can be particularly difficult to determine boundaries in the digital world. For this reason UN, 
ECtHR and EU mechanisms have introduced provisions (e.g. GDPR) recently in order to 
ensure that people do not suffer arbitrary and unjustified interference in this right. However, 
when we consider that more than 70 UN member states have still no legal provisions 
safeguarding this right, it is important that both these countries and international bodies take 
action as soon as possible.   
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